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Passing now from the genus to the species, I have to denounce as the most inexcusable
and scandalous noise the truly infernal cracking of whips in the narrow resounding
streets of towns; for it robs life of all peace and pensiveness.
Arthur Schopenhauer1
0.
Or rather, what did Schopenhauer hear when he was disturbed by the cracking of
whips and decided to write about noise? What was it so disturbing in the cracking of a
whip? A philosopher from whom Nietzsche borrowed immensely and forced this
borrowing to a point of distortion. A philosophy of noise? Yet, is it possible to
philosophize about noise? Did Nietzsche philosophize about noise?
‘On Din and Noise’2 by A. Schopenhauer – a rare essay in which a serious
philosopher, a philosopher of the will, seriously gets involved in noise and
philosophizes about noise. A question of resonance between the cracking of a whip
and the will of the philosopher. And also a question of resonance between
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche: two types of resonance.
The first type of resonance is about the tension between a philosopher (his resistance)
and the interruptive power of the cracking of a whip. Whereas the resonance between
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer is a catastrophic event and it gives way to distortion; and,
moreover, its giving way to distortion is not something that can be addressed to
‘perception’ in the Schopenhauerian sense of the word. Already in Nietzsche’s first
book, The Birth of Tragedy, it is not something which takes place as something visible or
audible.This type of resonance between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche is the one with
which I would like to put this essay into resonance.
In other words, I would like to remix in this essay what was already remixed by Nietzsche
– that is, Nietzsche’s remix of the Schopenhauerian tension between will and
contemplation into a relationship between the Dionysian and the Apollonian – by way
of reintroducing into this remix the question of the hearable. Finally, I will claim that it is
one of these two types of getting into resonance which lays bare a certain understanding of
noise, and which also forces Schopenhauer to the claim that he heard the noise.
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I. The Question of the Immediate
One possible way of tracing such a moment of distortion between Schopenhauer and
Nietzsche passes through a scrutinization of the question of the immediate which can
be found located in the way Schopenhauer produces a critique of the symptomatology
that is generally presumed to exist between ‘the kernel and the shell’,3 or the inner and
the outer nature.
Schopenhauer’s critique proceeds by way of pointing to an abyss which is usually
forgotten by scientific or conceptual knowledge. What the latter do in face of such an
abyss is to bridge it by means of representations. However, since all representations in
the end refer to the principle of sufficient reason, they can never give us an adequate
knowledge of this kernel, of what lies beyond our representations. Our representations
do not belong to the kernel because time, space, and causality are the characteristics of
the conceptual knowledge, and, therefore have got nothing to do with this beyond,
with this kernel. The essential failure of our representations emanates from the
direction they assume when they are producing scientific truth or knowledge.
Schopenhauer’s critique is not directed towards the impossibility of bridging this abyss
between inner nature and outer nature; he claims only that the way we bridge the
abyss with conceptual knowledge is wrong. For in the metaphor of shell and kernel the
direction is from outside towards inside, that is any act of representation brings its form
to what is formless from the outside, and this form does not belong to the kernel.
Schopenhauer’s aim is therefore to reverse this direction. For him, since the
relationship with the kernel cannot be maintained through the mediation of
representation, or the concepts, the philosopher must find a way to get rid of
mediation by offering a way from inside towards outside.
However, as the two volumes of The World as Will and Representation4 bear witness to,
how to eliminate the question of mediation proves to be a rather rigorous one, and it is
exactly at this point things start becoming more complicated. These moves are most
conveniently traceable in the definitions that Schopenhauer produces for terms such
as, ‘concepts’, ‘Idea’, ‘Will’, ‘Perception’, ‘the thing-in-itself’, ‘representation’, and also
in the way he picks up certain words for certain purposes.
First of all, the move from inside towards outside without mediation is determined by
Schopenhauer by an attempt to define the Ideas as in opposition to concepts. Concepts
in that respect are characterized by being ‘representations of representations’.5 This
means that their relationship to Will is only secondary whereas that which is in a
primary relationship to the Will is the Idea. If the concept’s relationship to the Will is
determined by the mediation of Ideas of which the concepts are copies; what relates
the Idea to Will is Perception (Anschauung). Concepts, the tools of science, cannot
function without introducing into their object a temporality and a spatiality: it means
that they can produce knowledge about their object only with respect to something
else, that is with respect to some other representations. In contrast, Will, or the thing-
in-itself is that about which only a fixed meaning should be produced. The foremost
distinction between Ideas and concepts is maintained by Schopenhauer by referring to
Kantian characteristics of the thing-in-itself. Accordingly, Will or the thing-in-itself do
not admit any form of causality determined by time and space because ‘they are only
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the forms of our knowledge, not qualities of the thing-in-itself.’6 This means that Ideas
assume the duty of the ‘‘objectification’’ of the Will, and they are ‘what Plato called the
eternal Ideas or unchangeable forms’.7
The term ‘objectification’ (Objectivation) certainly has a central role in the philosopher’s
distinctions between concepts and Ideas with respect to representation. For example,
whenever it is a matter of a relationship between his favourite concepts, such as
between Will and Idea, Body and Will, Will and the thing-in-itself, Schopenhauer pays
special care to use ‘objectification’ instead of representation (Vorstellung). Without
doubt, it is because, for Schopenhauer, representation is what concerns the concepts
which mediate knowledge only through the shells. In contrast, objectification is the
word which is supposed to enable the philosopher to get rid of the question of
mediation.8 Thus the primary position of an Idea with respect to Will by means of the
employment of the word ‘objectification’ is what saves the Idea from being a
representation, a mediation on the way to the Will.
Such a move, or such a privileging of the word ‘objectification’ over ‘representation’
thus (only) initially enables Schopenhauer to theorize the immediate by eliminating the
question of the mediation, or, to find a place where representation does not apply; and, without
doubt, through this move he not only becomes capable of regulating the relationship
between his favourite pairs of concepts, but also capable of overcoming the dialectics
which govern the conceptual knowledge. This and similar moves take place most
spectacularly when Schopenhauer accounts for 1) the relationship between the body
and the will; 2) ‘On the Possibility of Knowing the Thing-in-Itself’ in the second
volume of The World as Will and Representation; and, 3) the work of the genius with
respect to the call of the sublime.
1) For Schopenhauer, the kernel is the Will and the Will is the thing-in-itself, yet how
do we know it? Without doubt, through our body. The body, or, rather the actions of
the body, are what make one aware of the immediate relationship between body and
the objectification of the will. Objectification is that moment of my being aware of the
will through my body’s actions without any act of representation (that is, without an
image). Schopenhauer thus places the question of the objectification of the will into a
framework of a symptomatology where symptoms do not act as representative of
anything but as those by means of which the will is objectified in the body. However, in
the mean time, he also introduces his favourite term ‘Perception’ into the discussion.
He says: ‘The action of the body is nothing but the act of will objectified (objectivierte),
i.e., translated into perception (Anschauung)’.9 And what is striking here is that
Schopenhauer does not translate into ‘Vorstellung’ but ‘Anschauung’.10
For sure, Schopenhauer’s intention is to problematize the relationship between the
kernel and the shell, and thus to save it from a simple-minded symptomatology.
However, does the introduction of the word objectification constitute a different
schema, a schema different from representation? Doesn’t it mean that that which is
problematized is being reappropriated here in a supposedly unproblematical way, as if
to call it ‘perception’ or ‘objectification’ can save it from a schema of representation?
Schopenhauer acts as if there can be a way out of representation, or furthermore, as if
one can offer a new model of representation. Everything revolves around this question:
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Is it possible to determine a place where representation does not apply (where the question of
mimesis can be forgotten)?
2) That perception (Anschauung) cannot be thought in a schema other than a
representational one, haunts the work of the philosopher once again especially in
chapter 18 (‘On the Possibility of Knowing the Thing-in-Itself’) of Volume II.
Here, it is as if Schopenhauer is setting barriers upon barriers against the return of
phantoms by reasserting the symptomatology that he already did in the first volume.
The immediacy that determines the relationship between will, perception and body
this time is taken from a different angle that leads to the upsurging of an immense
question: What is the relationship between the Will and the thing-in-itself?
Schopenhauer’s answer is ‘I teach that the inner nature of everything is will and I
call the will the thing-in-itself’.11
In the same chapter, a few paragraphs earlier, Schopenhauer writes about a certain
modification that he brings to Kant’s theory. He quotes Kant:
All concepts which do not have their basis a perception in space and
time (sensuous perception), or in other words, have not been drawn
from such a perception, are absolutely empty, that is to say, they give us
no knowledge. But as perception can furnish only phenomena, not
things-in-themselves, we too have absolutely no knowledge of things-in-
themselves.12
Schopenhauer admits this but what he is critical of, is that immediacy is what
distinguishes Will from all the other objects of knowledge. So as against the
nothingness, or the emptiness of the Kantian thing-in-itself, he proposes that the
Will which he holds as identical with the thing-in-itself presents us with a ‘relative
nothing’:
If the will were positively and absolutely the thing-in-itself, then this
nothing would be absolute, instead of which it expressly appears to us
there only as a relative nothing.13
Then it means that in contrast to what Schopenhauer defends, the will is not the thing-
in-itself; it is different from the thing-in-itself for it has some immediate attributes which
make themselves felt and known in a representative schema – hence its relative
nothingness differentiates it from the absolute nothingness of the thing-in-itself. Then it
also means that the Will acts as a representative for the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-
itself reveals itself by using the immediacy of the will.
Strangely enough, without giving us any clues about how this different representative
schema differs from the ordinary one, Schopenhauer closes the matter. Apparently,
he decides. Yet despite this decision, that is, a decision that decides to theorize
the immediate, one realizes – as one reads Schopenhauer – that the immediate




Immediacy calls for a theory of the event. Can one theorize the event? Will
Schopenhauer accept this call?
3) If all this can be taken as producing a decision upon something which cannot be
decided, such a decision requires also an agent who can decide. This agent – a
mediator par excellence – is the genius who is mainly characterized by Schopenhauer as
an agent with immense powers of contemplation.
If art is characterized with a density for ‘pure contemplation’ in the name of the
apprehension of the Ideas, and their communication to the others, the genius, for
Schopenhauer is the agent who is capable of assuming two duties at the same time: 1)
apprehension, or perception of the Ideas; and, 2) their communication to the others.14
Given these duties, the genius, in other words, is a mediator between the Idea and the
artwork. With exceptional powers of contemplation and perception he endeavours to
snatch the Ideas from the ‘thraldom of the will’,15 and thus gives them a certain aspect
of communicability in works of art. Most important of all, the objects of knowledge of
the genius are the Ideas which can be obtained, not via abstractions, that is by referring
to other representations, but only through perception. Schopenhauer’s stress on the
importance of the perception of Ideas is of course related to his interest to preserve
the distinction between concepts and Ideas. Therefore, when the genius is related to
the contemplation, or the perception of Ideas, in his duty as the mediator between the
Idea and the artwork, he should never refer to representation (Vorstellung) which
characterizes the concepts. As we have seen before, Schopenhauer introduces different
words at different times in order to get away from the determinations of the word,
Vorstellung; and this time, with the intention of stressing that the genius’s duty has got
nothing to do with representation, he employs a different word: repetition
(Wiederholung).16 Hence, the Ideas apprehended by the genius are not representations
of the Will, but their immediate objectifications in his perception, and the artwork
which he produces out of them are not the representations of his perceptions but only
their ‘repetitions’. Thus, the genius’s capacity of perceiving the Ideas is determined by
the distance he keeps from the call of the Will.
The extreme form of this duty which even threatens the genius’s endeavour to be a
will-less subject can be found in Schopenhauer’s description of the sublime.17 Sublime,
in Schopenhauer, functions as the genius’s resistance to the call of the will – a call
which threatens not only the endeavour of genius towards the contemplation of the
Idea, but also the theory of the will-less subject of knowledge. Hence, the enumeration
of arts in Schopenhauer comes as a response to the danger, a threat which is directed
to the subject from the realm of the Will. Arts in that sense constitute a shield against
these dangers and protect the subject from such an abolishment. Various arts are thus
put into an order according to the degree of protection they present.
Schopenhauer’s theory of art is without doubt haunted by the same issues that lead to
the question of the untheorizable. However, instead of stressing once again these
conflicts that are due to Schopenhauer’s application of his theory to arts,18 I would like
to show next what happens to the question of the untheorizable, the question of the
immediate when it comes to theorizing music. Because, one can argue that it is
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especially here Schopenhauer realizes that his theory of the Will suffers greatly from
some unresolved conflicts, and he develops some moves which, rather than resolving
these conflicts, amplify them to such an extent that music transforms into a ‘sublime’
object par excellence.
II. Music
After this, we find that there is yet another fine art that remains
excluded, and was bound to be excluded, from our considerations, for
in the systematic connection of our discussion there was no fitting place
for it; this art is music.19
All the theory of art that Schopenhauer produces until he introduces his theory of
music concerns the specular. In other words, under the light of a decision taken to
theorize the immediate by means of a different terminology (which nevertheless cannot
eliminate the representational character of his theory), all the arts are categorized on
the presupposition of a distinction between Anschauung and Vorstellung, and also the
presence of a genius, who will ‘perceive’ the Ideas and ‘repeat’ them in his artwork.
However, now, Schopenhauer realizes that a theory of music that follows from an
unresolved question of the immediate will create problems basically due to following
reasons: 1) privileging of Anschauung over Vorstellung does not explain anything anymore
when it comes to music because music is aural and escapes the specular; 2) that music
is aural means that it is more immediate than other arts, and therefore does not need a
mediator as ‘objectification in Ideas through Perception’. In face of these difficulties,
Schopenhauer miraculates another strategy which even he himself cannot demonstrate
or verify.20 To paraphrase Schopenhauer, music’s relationship to the world is utterly
complicated because music, unlike other arts, does not come as a copy of something
which precedes it; or, better, that which precedes music cannot be represented.
Schopenhauer cannot ‘demonstrate’21 this but it doesn’t stop him from another move
whereby he takes music one step closer to Will. Hence, he concludes:
Thus music is as immediate an objectification and copy (Abbild) of the
whole will as the world itself is, indeed as the Ideas are, the multiplied
phenomenon of which constitutes the world of individual things.
Therefore music is by no means like the other arts, namely a copy
(Abbild) of the Ideas, but a copy of the will itself, the objectivity of which
are the Ideas.22
When Schopenhauer moves music one step closer to the Will, his intention is obviously
to tame what does not fit into specular schema – for, he has realized now, that which
does not fit into specular schema is bound to function as a threat to his theory of the
sublime, because it is formless (as Will), and given its immediacy, it casts a threat to the
genius: it can absorb the genius into itself.23
However, there are also other things, dangerous things that this move leads the
Schopenhauerian theory unto. First of all, when music is thus pushed closer to the Will,
a certain characteristic of arts for Schopenhauer, that is their power of copying (Abbild),
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which is supposed to disappear does not disappear. Hence, he has to preserve ‘copying’
together with ‘objectification’. On the other hand, a relationship of copying can be
established only with respect to a model. Yet here, what takes the place of a model is
the Will, which by, definition, is formless. If this were a relationship of Vorstellung, yes,
then music in this new place could be understood as that which gives form to what is
formless. But Schopenhauer says ‘objectification’ and ‘copying’. At that point, we
should be reminded of the last resort that Schopenhauer used between the Will and the
thing-in-itself in order to explain the immediacy between the two, and the question of
the ‘relative nothing’. If music does not require the priority of Ideas in order to be
music, then it means it has its own power of giving form not via Vorstellung, that is, via
representing the Will, but by ‘copying’ what cannot be represented, which is, according
to Schopenhauer, not nothing but a ‘relative nothing’. Yet, even so, the relative
nothing is that which requires a form in order to be understood as such, and hence, it
cannot exist outside a representational schema.
But how is it possible that music can give form to what is formless as long as
Schopenhauer doesn’t accept that it is a matter of Vorstellung?
Is it music that Schopenhauer is theorizing or something else?24
Here is something which does not come after the event. Schopenhauer is treating that
which does not come after the event in a dialectical schema. This something is ‘music’,
according to him.
III. Nietzsche
In The Birth of Tragedy, there are numerous references to Schopenhauer:
1) In section 5, Nietzsche disagrees with Schopenhauer on the question of the lyric poet
because Schopenhauer follows traditional ways in approaching the lyric poetry.25 The
lyric poetry for both modern aesthetics and Schopenhauer is ‘an incompletely attained
art that arrives at its goal infrequently and only, as it were, by leaps’.26 For Nietzsche,
on the other hand, the ‘I’ of the lyric poet, Archilochus, can never be taken as an alibi
for a subjectivity because ‘its ‘‘subjectivity’’, in the sense of modern aestheticians is a
fiction’.27
2) In section 16, Nietzsche quotes large paragraphs from Schopenhauer on the
question of the copy – that ‘music is the immediate copy of the will itself’. Does
Nietzsche follow here Schopenhauer’s will to offer a new mimetic model which was
supposed to distinguish music from all the other arts? Or, does he acknowledge
Schopenhauer’s failure by offering a strange relationship between the kernel and the
shell, Dionysos and Apollo, the-thing-in-itself and appearances?
I offer these cases with the intention of pointing out a central issue which, remaining
concealed in the discussion, gives way to a notion that all is a matter of what Nietzsche
decided to ‘‘borrow’’ from Schopenhauer. This point is where Nietzsche quotes
Schiller in order to support his thought on the subject and the lyric poet:
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Schiller has thrown some light on the poetic process by a psychological
observation, inexplicable but unproblematic to his own mind. He
confessed that before the act of creation he did not have before him or
within him any series of images (Bildern) in a causal arrangement, but
rather a musical mood (musicalische Stimmung). (‘Within me the
perception (Empfindung) has at first no clear and definite object; this is
formed later. A certain musical mood comes first, and the poetical idea
only follows later’).28
First of all, what kind of a mood is that? Why is it musical, that is something aural,
instead of being something specular? Whether it be aural or specular, perception
(Empfindung: ‘percept: an impression of an object obtained by use of the senses’29) is
what follows a ‘musical mood’ which ties the act of creation to an experience of the
aural.30
What I would like to question here is whether in this very quotation Nietzsche sees a
passage from chaos to figure, from inner to outer nature, as for example,
Schopenhauer would put it, or a certain relationship between two realms which can
best be described as ‘resonance’?31
So now if we return to the question of the lyric poet, Archilochus, in both Nietzsche
and Schopenhauer, one essential difference between two philosophers can be found in
the differences each assigned to the relationship between the formless and the formed.
For Schopenhauer, such a passage requires a fully-formed subject, who is a subject
only insofar as its integrity is preserved as against the call of the Will, the formless
matter: this step should be taken once and for all, without leaving behind any
possibility of a return to the formless (though, as we have seen, in Schopenhauer the
experience of the sublime always carries this risk of falling back). Yet for Nietzsche
things are obviously different:
Hence our aesthetics must first solve the problem of how the ‘lyrist’ is
possible as an artist – he who, according to the experience of all ages, is
continually saying ‘I’ and running through the entire chromatic scale of
his passions and desires. Compared with Homer, Archilochus appals us
by his cries of hatred and scorn, by his drunken outbursts of desire.
Therefore is not he, who has been called the first subjective artist,
essentially the non-artist?32
So, for Nietzsche, if there is a border between the formless and the formed, it is there
not as a rigid line of separation between two realms but as a border, constituted anew
at each attempt of constructing oneself as a subject. In other words, for him, it is a
matter of resonance on both sides of a border which constructs and destroys the very
border in question, and hence the passage remains always as a problem. Yet, if
Nietzsche problematizes this crossing, the passage from chaos to the phenomenal, what
should we think about the music that Schiller is talking about?
In order to trace some possible answers for this question, let us concentrate on
Nietzsche’s way of putting into ‘resonance’ also the relationship between Dionysos and
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Apollo. For Nietzsche, dreams are where images, figures or appearances (Apollonian
forms) are constituted as symptoms of an underlying substratum (Dionysian chaos) – as
in a relationship between a kernel and a shell. With respect to its form-giving power,
Apollo is therefore the god of the principium individuationis. However, in opposition to
that, Dionysos operates as the god of intoxication towards the destruction of what has
assumed form. This way of describing the relationship between Dionysos and Apollo is
rather well known, however things change dramatically when one adds to this
description the following passage in Section 2:
Thus far we have considered the Apollonian and its opposite, the
Dionysian, as artistic energies which burst forth from nature herself,
without the mediation of the human artist (ohne Vermittelung des
menschichen Künstlers) – energies in which nature’s art impulses are
satisfied in the most immediate and direct way – first in the image world
of dreams, whose completeness is not dependent upon the intellectual
attitude or the artistic culture of any single being; and then as
intoxicated reality, which likewise does not heed the single unit, but
even seeks to destroy the individual and redeem him by a mystic feeling
of oneness. With reference to these immediate art-states of nature, every
artist is an ‘imitator’ (Nachahmer).33
Here, Nietzsche seems to be suggesting that ‘artistic’ creation happens in a two-fold
process where the folds cannot be separated from each other. If the bursting forth of
artistic energies (Dionysian and Apollonian) finds an image in one fold in ‘the image
world of dreams’, the other fold, developing in a parallel fashion, is determined by a
destruction of these images. Therefore, the artist, within the ‘immediate art-states of
nature’ is the one who never comes into being as such, or as a fully formed subject,
because his/her coming into being is always interrupted by a battle between
Apollonian and Dionysian forces. Such a relationship between the folds also eliminates
the question of the first because, even if the Dionysian forces seem to be secondary in
this process, they already contain, and are contained within, Apollonian forces, and the
same holds true for the Apollonian forces. In other words, the two opposite forces are
put into resonance by Nietzsche just to bar the ‘‘subject’’ from coming into being. And
this is why here, Nietzsche does not talk about an artist: the artist only comes too late,
after the event, as an imitator of this process with an end product, the work of art.
However, as we know it from Nietzsche’s formulation of the tragic, the lyrist, (‘the non-
artist’) is the one who can imitate this process in art works so that the Socratic truth
never appears as such in a dialectical fashion. In other words, although the relationship between
two folds seems to be determined by a model/copy relationship, this relationship is simulacral rather
than mimetic because the passage between the formed and the formless is a simultaneous, continuous and
a reversible process. Therefore, the essential question for Nietzsche, unlike Schopenhauer,
is not ‘Can there be an art which actualizes the immediate?’ but ‘Can art point to the
immediate?’ For Schopenhauer, as we have seen, this art is music. However, in
Nietzsche, this turns into a question that cannot be directly answered. He writes:
In the first place, as a Dionysian artist [the lyrist] he has identified
himself with the primal unity, its pain and contradiction. Assuming that
music has been correctly termed a repetition (Wiederholung) and a
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recast (zweiter Abguss) of the world, we may say that he produces the
copy (Abbild) of this primal unity as music. Now, however, under the
Apollonian dream inspiration, this music reveals itself to him again as a
symbolic dream image. The inchoate, intangible reflection of the
primordial pain in music, with its redemption in mere appearance, now
produces a second mirroring as a specific symbol or example. The artist
has already surrendered his subjectivity in the Dionysian process. The
image that now shows him his identity with the heart of the world is a
dream scene that embodies the primordial contradiction and primordial
pain, together with the primordial pleasure, of mere appearance. The
‘I’ of the lyrist therefore sounds from the depth of his being: its
‘subjectivity’, in the sense of modern aestheticians is a fiction.34
I propose that at this juncture we should try to discuss that in the quotation above there
are two types of music for Nietzsche. The first is the Dionysian type of music (here the
lyrist is one with the primal unity and ‘he produces the copy of this primal unity as
music’), and it is right there, in face of an impossibility of thinking about music without
mimesis, Nietzsche’s theory falls out of resonance with Schopenhauer’s and thus forces
the relationship between the philosophers to resonance, distortion and noise.
The second type of music, the Apollonian one, comes on top of this as in a relationship
of a model and a copy (‘The inchoate, intangible reflection of the primordial pain in
music, with its redemption in mere appearance, now produces a second mirroring as a
specific symbol or example’). However, as we have seen above, the strange mimetic
relationship between these two types of ‘mirroring’ is opened up to the simulacral yet
with one critical question to be answered now: Is it music that Nietzsche is talking
about as far as the first type of music is concerned? Or better, can this ‘music’ be
heard?
For Schopenhauer, as we have seen before, music – theorized within a proximity to the
immediate – knows no such Nietzschean distinctions; it supposedly does not, or should
not obey to the rule of a model/copy relationship; it can be heard under every
circumstances; and it can exist even when there is no one to hear it.
Yet, to obtain such a clarity of thought from Nietzsche is rather difficult because his
relationship to the mimetic is determined neither by a rejection nor a pure acceptance.
For Nietzsche, in other words, music, in contrast to all the theorization with respect to
the question of the immediate, still remains one step away from the ‘primal unity’ just
as all the other arts. Music therefore can only be heard if it is music, that is, if it is
formed within a model and copy relationship. However, if in the Nietzschean theory
there is still no clear answer as to whether the first type of music can be heard, it is
because of the way in which Nietzsche puts two types of music in a simulacral
relationship where they are put into resonance, eliminating the question of the first. If
one cannot theorize the first type of music, if it is that which escapes the theory, it is not
because it cannot be heard but because it remains as the unheard within what is heard.
Music and all the other arts are thus given a new position where they all point to the the
question of the immediate without claiming to actualize it. The question of the
immediate in Nietzsche is no more related to music, but to something unthinkable, or
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untheorizable, or, undecidable, or to something which is there as a different type of
relationship between two realms, say, between, the real and the apparent, the will and
the idea, the original and the copy, etc. – a matter of resonance and noise. But can one
hear the noise?
IV. Noise
At this juncture, though in an abrupt way, as if to amplify the noise, I would like to be
interrupted by a concern for what Schopenhauer thought about noise:
In the same way a great mind is no more capable than an ordinary one,
the moment it is interrupted, disturbed, distracted, and diverted. For its
superiority is conditioned by its concentrating all its powers, as does a
concave mirror all its rays, on to one point and object; and it is precisely
here that it is prevented by a noisy interruption. This is why eminent
minds have always thoroughly disliked every kind of disturbance,
interruption, and diversion, but above all, the violent disturbance
caused by din and noise. The most sensible and intelligent of all
European nations has even laid down an eleventh commandment, the
rule, Never Interrupt! Din is the most impertinent of all forms of
interruption, for it interrupts, in fact disrupts, even our own
thoughts.[…] Passing now from the genus to the species, I have to
denounce as the most inexcusable and scandalous noise the truly
infernal cracking of whips in the narrow resounding streets of towns; for
it robs life of all peace and pensiveness.35
I would like to draw attention to the following possible remarks:
1) In Schopenhauer, the flow of thought is interrupted by the cracking of a whip. That
which pertains to a flow is a flow for it pertains to a consideration of thought within
time and space. Thought, then, is that which takes place within time and space. The
genius is there to think, in time, in a flow, to stop the wheel of Ixion36 by perceiving the
Ideas. So, what happens to Schopenhauer’s flow of thought at the moment of its
interruption by a whip is that the latter destroys this schema of time and space in which
thought takes place. Where he is drawn to after the experience of this crack is an
atemporal and aspatial realm that does not allow him to continue his flow of thought.
This atemporal and aspatial realm, as we know, is the realm of the Will according to
the philosopher (just as in Homer’s description of what happens to those who listen to
the Sirens’ song: they forget all past and future). It is a dangerous realm for it is where
one cannot follow, or constitute a flow of thought – a realm of desires, bodily needs, a
realm that is governed by madness. This realm cannot be represented except for this
cracking of a whip. Hence, the realm of noise is also the realm of the Will because this
is where the chaos is. Is noise that which comes from a realm that Schopenhauer failed
to theorize?
2) The problem with this line of thought is that it hears what it describes as the
unhearable. When it is heard, it comes as noise, and when it cannot be heard it
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presents itself as Will. And the cracking of a whip constitutes a threshold, an explosive
line of demarcation between two realms. On the one side there is the realm of the Will,
noise, the thing-in-itself, on the other, there is the realm of flow, harmony, music,
thought. And the cracking of a whip is that which disturbs this line of demarcation with
a blow and bars the messenger from making its message received.
As if one could conclude: we have music because we cannot hear the ‘music’.
V. The Event
Let’s try to ‘visualize’, get the ‘perception’ (Anschauung) of what happened to Nietzsche
at a similar moment of hearing the cracking of a whip. The scene takes place in Turin
and it is a moment of collapse. It is usually referred to as follows:
On January the 3rd 1888, Nietzsche was in the piazza Carlo Alberto, in
Turin, Italy. Seeing a coachman brutally flog a horse, he intervened,
and collapsed, shielding the horse from the whip. Carried back to his
lodgings, he comes around, but he is no longer sane.37
Can one really perceive, represent, put into images, what happened to Nietzsche when
he heard the cracking of the whip? What did Nietzsche hear? The noise that
immensely disturbed Schopenhauer? We should doubt it. If it were noise, then it
should have disturbed him. Did it disturb him? What is the limit of disturbance? Is
‘noise’ there for us to hear? Is it possible to be disturbed by noise? An invitation.
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